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A Defense of Theory: Interpretation as
an Adventure on the Border Line
Giovanna Franci
The discussion of the role of theory in recent critical debates on
interpretation has been very lively. This has been particularly true in
the United States, where, because of a mistaken sense of pragmatism,
theory is often confused with ideology or methodology. In this paper
I will try to expand upon my own idea of theory. I will argue for a
conception of theory that frames theory as an inner tension and an
incessant process of thought, one which underlies all interpretive acts
and which evades not only the object under analysis in each single
discipline, but also the profession of different cultural fashions and
critical trends.
Every now and then I find myself forced to answer an urgent ques-
tion: "Which side are you on?" I am asked; or, "Under which King,
Bezonian?" as the "reactionary" F.R. Leavis provokingly entitled one
of his pamphlets written in the 1930s. In The Idea of a University
Leavis was already beginning to cope with rising problems like that of
"Mass Civilization and Minority Culture." Although that time was
certainly different from ours, many problems which have character-
ized our period were already present: the leveling down of culture
with respect to mass society, the decay of tradition in the face of new
forms of technological barbarism, the relationship between the elite
and the majority, changes in language in a new Babel and, above all,
the questioning of the didactic function of the university and the task
of criticism to "scrutinize" the values of life. With regard to all these
issues, the risk of dividing into "Apocalittici e integrati," roughly
quoting Umberto Eco's dichotomy of some years ago, is imminent.
This is particularly true for my generation which has always lived "out
of time," too late or too early in relation to certain important changes.
This happened to us in 1968, as opposed to the generation of eighteen-
year-olds, and again in the seventies during the dreadful years of ter-
rorism, or during the struggles of the most radical and separatist femi-
nism (and, of course, we were not at all at ease with old-fashioned
Academia). However, this contradictory position towards the difficult
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relationship between a changing society and the values to be pre-
served, between realism and utopia, also contains positive aspects.
The presence of such positive aspects is the reason why certain decon-
structive criticism, or negative hermeneutics, from the seventies
onward has attracted my attention. This interpretive stance was based
not on final certainties, but rather on a continuous questioning, both
in politics and in literary criticism.
How, then, does a member of the "out of time" generation describe
the current historical moment? The socialist dream of setting
oppressed people and women free has never come true, at least not in
the ways expected or wished for in the past. The end of ideology, the
actual as well as metaphorical collapse of walls, has annulled the old
opposition between blocs: capitalism and communism, reaction and
revolution, the right and the left, the reactionary and the conservative.
In Europe the debate is now rendered in postideological terms, even
with an unprecedented breakdown of political credibility in Italian
politics, or, even more tragically, in the face of the terrible civil war in
the former Yugoslavia. The confusion of ideas following the crisis of
foundations has created contradictory phenomena that mix various
aspects of the same problem. Instead of radically claiming the right to
equality, as in the past, today it is the idea or right to difference that is
radically claimed. Claims to difference, which made their appearance
in Europe during the seventies (especially as a consequence of the
influence of psychoanalysis), have now resurfaced in both Europe and
America. Thus, left-wing ideas, once dead in the old continent, have
paradoxically moved west into the country that was once seen as the
natural center of capitalism. The inclination to generalize, to judge on
the basis of the most important problems and universal categories
valid for everybody, must now not only come to terms with a world
characterized by the global circulation of ideas, but also with subtle
changes which require that we pay attention to different realities.
At the same time, together with the ghost of the engaged artist-the
organic intellectual who has returned like a phoenix rising once again
from the ashes-there has reappeared in the American academic
world the intellectual's sense of guilt. It is a process not unlike the
process of self-negation, the negation of one's own role, which many
European professors underwent in 1968. The same sense of guilt, or
aesthetic original sin, emerges as the intellectual suffers from his love
for poetry and art, or from his belonging to a privileged class which,
having the power, dominates and manipulates culture. What develops
is a sense of guilt towards exploited and marginalized people, once
represented by the working class and now by the Third World and
racial "minorities." Under the generic and all-inclusive label of "cul-
tural studies," offshoots of new leftist thought have taken root again.
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In the fertile soils of gender studies and ethnic studies-in short, polit-
ical commitment-literature and society are grafted together.
In the face of this, Europeans live in a condition of uneasiness.
Having experienced d6jA vu with the return of old problems, we are
now forced to understand and come to terms with the fact that phe-
nomena are never the same as we used to know them, and that they
often change during the voyage of ideas from one country to another,
from one historical period to another. Therefore, it is now necessary
to re-examine ideas and prejudices, to submit old stereotypes to a pro-
cess of linguistic revision, and to reconceive those juxtaposed binary
terms which have not yet acquired new meanings in our dialectic
mentality and lexicon. In fact, implied in the "end of ideologies" has
been the collapse of schemes and cultural paradigms that regulated
our way of thinking and judging up to a few decades ago. Thus, all
great critiques, including that of literary criticism, have proven inade-
quate to the task of explaining the complexity of new situations. This
inadequacy resides in the perceived necessity to govern and regulate
new complexities, as well as in the teaching of single disciplines, for
which an even more specialized preparation is required. The political
essence of the intellectual and the critic requires that he should do his
job well. His is a profession which has always focused on the search
for truth, on the search for both a "disinterested" truth and, in the
words of Harold Bloom, for an experiential criticism, for one's own
inner paradigm.
In unquestioningly accepting so-called "cultural studies," we run the
risk of merely revising old stereotypes without subjecting them to a
more thorough analysis. Now, as much as ever, one should avoid con-
forming to fashions that are both ephemeral and actual, or, to use the
Nietzschean term, "timely." It is not by changing tout court the object
of study or the subject matter discussed in a course that society is
changed. Substituting a course on Milton with one on Rock Culture,
Madonna, or an important but unknown African-American woman
writer does not transform society. Similarly, traditional culture cannot
be supported by merely defending Milton instead of Rock Culture,
Madonna, or unknown African-American women writers. This does
not mean, of course, that we can simply ignore proposed or actual
change or the inherent difficulties that attend such change. Nor
should we consider the complexity of these problems an excuse for
not seeking change. We must understand what engagement, change,
and renewal mean today. Above all, we need to reconsider the way
certain events are recorded and analyzed for us. I remember, for
example, the nonconformist role which semiotics played in the 1960s
as applied to popular literature. Such studies remarkably contributed
to renovating a formerly conservative scenario and, paradoxically,
1994]
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their ironic disengagement brought about more change than an open
but already institutionalized engagement.
Now, it is certainly difficult to connect specializations with the uni-
versal and to reassemble the scattered fragments in some way without
being able to count on an absolute criterion. However, what institu-
tion if not the university should have the appointed task of searching
for, finding, and then teaching an adequate culture? The university
needs to fulfill its role as universitas, a place which always has been
and always should be the cradle of knowledge and research, of inter-
pretation and education, always on the border line as it extends the
boundaries of thought. This is a universe where the plurality of points
of view in a multicultural society must be confronted by a new and
revised concept of comparatism. As Umberto Eco noted in his inau-
gural lecture, the university must take a central position between the
mass media and society; providing above all the research and analyti-
cal tools for the data which we are given by the world of information.
More than this, the university must always be ahead of the datum,
with no fear of theoretical speculations, no censorship, and no threat
of scandal. It must therefore achieve that basic freedom of research
and teaching that derives from the heritage of our humanistic tradi-
tion. I am conscious that this can sound somewhat naive, especially
coming from a chaotic and frantic university system such as our own
(Bologna has 90,000 students), in which contemporaneously we may
have everything and its opposite. However, I love "untimely" propos-
als, as Nietzsche did, and I am also conscious that we are confronted
with an epochal turning point at which we need even more tolerance,
and more imagination as well.
What then is the duty of the university? The duty is not to solve
directly society's problems. The current debate on curricula and
canon has misperceived the role of the university, dramatizing, along
with the contradictions of society, the contradictions of the university.
Research should be the professed duty of the university. It should be
conceived as a critical rethinking, the object of which is never taken
for granted, where the how becomes in its development the what, and
theory and practice continuously merge.
University as universitas can and must be the place where theory
not only is propounded and extolled, but also becomes its essential
content. A place where, in the pedagogical dialogue, the students are
driven to develop their own critical sense and intellectual curiosity.
These are the only elements that will prevent students from accepting
uncritically the productions of mass society. Theory should not be
considered as an aseptic, abstract, and separate idea, but, as an over-
view, a clear perception of principles, always sought for, on which the
world order is based. As I discuss this point with American friends, I
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find myself defending my idea of theory against a misunderstanding
by which theory is often assimilated to methodology, standardized in
fixed rules or crystallized in ideology. As usual, since words can have
different meanings within different contexts, it is important to agree
on the precise meaning that we want to give them. Theory, therefore,
implies a hermeneutical stance and an incessant act of questioning
which produces a dialogic tension-a difficult balance between tradi-
tional knowledge and contemporary culture displaying the courage to
defend the "uselessness" of literature. As a final word, my idea of
theory is based on a process of reading and interpretation which is
always ready to question its own methods and tools: a serious and, at
the same time, ironic doctrine of revisionism, an eternal "adventure"
on the border line.
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